Episode 83: Relationships and Money
Episode 82: A Rally, Really?
Episode 81: Suffering-You've Got To Embrace It
Episode 80: Hold On
Episode 79: No, Really, This Time It's For Real
Episode 78: 30 Minutes Or Less
Episode 77: What Is Truth?
Episode 76: Growth Misconduct
Episode 75: Passive Aggressive
Episode 74: Dividends Aren't What They Used To Be
Episode 73: Israel and Market Depth
Episode 72: Hot Take-Scandal Sells!
Episode 71: Public Vs. Private
Episode 70: Forfeiting The Dating Game
Episode 69: From The Headlines
Episode 68:
Episode 67: Planning To Fail
Episode 66: Faith
Episode 65: We Aren't The Only Ones
Episode 64: You'll Know It When You See It
Episode 63: Football, Music and Fraud
Episode 62: Short Selling-The Worst Thing Since...
Episode 61: Bowling for Dollars
Episode 60: Threading the Needle
Episode 59: Aging Gracelessly
Episode 58: Overrated/Underrated
Episode 57: SPAC Attacke
Episode 56: Are You Experienced?
Episode 55: Backdoor Pilots
Episode 54: Information vs. Wisdom
Episode 53: Is The Stock Market More Volatile Than It Used To Be?
Episode 52: You Can't Do That While Social Distancing
Episode 51: Chevron and Coinbase
Episode 50: Cash Forever!
Episode 49: If The Government Helps, It Will Cost You
Episode 48: Another Reason To Hate Light Beer
Investment Climate April 2023: The Fed, Banks and Business
Episode 47: Valuation Is In The Eye Of The...Valuationer?
Gerry on "Money Life with Chuck Jaffe" Again!
Episode 46: Short Attention Span Theater
Episode 45: Is Hyperinflation Coming?
Episode 44: Gerry Can't Drive 55
Getting back to real investing, March 2023 edition
ABOVE: An actual bank run, in Germany in 1931 -- not a scene from a movie!
image: Wikimedia Commons (link).
In the wake of the failure of Silicon Valley Bank last week (and Signature Bank of NY over the weekend, both of which followed closely on the failure of Silvergate Bank earlier in the week), plenty of news outlets are describing the cause as "an old-fashioned bank run," often adding a reference to the famous bank-run scene from It's a Wonderful Life (1946).
In one sense, that comparison isn't inaccurate, but there are some very important differences too -- differences that investors living in 2023 should take time to understand.
As Bloomberg author Matt Levine explains in a very well-written article here, Silicon Valley Bank "could probably have muddled through and been profitable if people had just kept their money in the bank: Its maturities were laddered, its deposit rates weren't going up that much, it did have a positive net interest margin even this quarter, it did have various ways to make money, and if people had just kept their money in, the bonds would have matured and been replaced by higher-earning bonds and SVB would have been fine."
He explains that the bank also would probably have survived if it had been allowed to borrow from the Fed against its assets at the face-value of those assets -- but that if the Fed insisted on marking those assets down (due to the rising interest rates resulting from the Fed's extremely rapid and steep tightening over the past twelve months) following "mark-to-market" accounting, then such markdowns would make SVB insolvent in the face of rapid withdrawals, which is exactly what happened.
If you are not a banker and don't necessarily understand the mechanics of the above description, check out Matt Levine's article. But we would point out that the possibility of insolvency due to a bank run is well understood and not a new danger -- and the banking system has had safeguards in place for almost a hundred years in order to prevent people from losing all confidence in the system and pulling their money from every bank when they see banks start collapsing the way we have seen three banks collapse over the past several days.
So what is new and what is important to understand about the current situation?
What is different from the bank runs of the Wonderful Life era is the fact that we are now in an era that enables the constant moving of money using mobile devices -- a phenomenon that was not present until the rise of the smartphone, which has transformed society so thoroughly that even fairly recent movies made before the advent of the mobile era look like they are set in a completely different world from the one we live in today (and in many ways, they are).
In fact, the most-recent financial crisis of 2008-2009 (which was caused by a different set of banking mistakes than the ones we are seeing take down the banks this week) was itself a crisis that took place prior to the current era of mobile money movement: the very first iPhone did not even appear until the year 2007, and it took a few years before smartphones became ubiquitous the way they are now.
This important transformation of society since the appearance of the smartphone cannot be emphasized enough -- and it should be noted that the Fed has not raised rates as much and in such a short period of time as it has recently, at least not in most people's memory.
The mobile era makes it very easy for depositors to pull their money out of a bank in a heartbeat (they don't have to crowd into a physical building or line up around the corner, the way they did in Its a Wonderful Life or in the actual bank run shown in the photo above).
On the other side of the balance sheet, the bank holds assets which counterbalance the deposit accounts that the bank owes to its depositors. The bank may be forced to sell or borrow against these assets in the event depositors start demanding their deposits back en masse. In the modern era of high-frequency trading of bonds and other securities in which banks typically invest, and since those bank assets are "marked-to-market", this can result in a bank becoming insolvent very quickly.
In the current case, these bank's bond portfolios were hit hard given the rapid rise in interest rates engineered by the Fed in the wake of rampant inflation, which was itself brought on by profligate government spending (some $10 trillion in two years!). A year ago, at the beginning of March 2022, the effective Fed funds rate was only 0.8%. Today, the effective Fed funds rate is 4.57%.
All of this is connected! We now live in an era of mobile money, in which investors have been encouraged to make second-by-second valuation decisions and second-by-second trading decisions -- and in which bank assets can be marked-to-market on a second-by-second basis.
This mentality can lead to bank panics like the one that took down Silicon Valley Bank. If depositors get spooked, they can pull their deposits almost instantaneously, and if the system that is supposed to enable banks to borrow against assets now insists on marking those assets down to their immediate market values (instead of valuing them as if they will be held-to-maturity), then collapse becomes almost inevitable.
Another important difference from the famous scene in Its a Wonderful Life: in that movie, the townspeople who were panicking and starting the run on the bank were portrayed as simple, honest, hardworking men and women. They were not sophisticated investors: they were just ordinary people who needed to pay a doctor bill or buy food to make it through the week.
But the depositors who frequented Silicon Valley Bank included some of the wealthiest venture capitalists and institutional investors in the world, as well as the young companies they funded. The same can be said for the trading firms who made up the majority of the depositors at Silvergate Bank, as well as those who frequented Signature Bank of New York.
As professional investors ourselves, we have never bought into the "fast money," nanosecond-by-nanosecond, "flash trading" schemes favored by these supposedly sophisticated institutional investors. The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank shows that when it comes to a bank run, the venture capitalists and self-styled "tech investors" of Sand Hill Road act a lot like the panicking townspeople of Its a Wonderful Life, except that in the age of mobile devices and instant money movement, they can pull their deposits out a lot quicker!
In fact, this whole sorry spectacle highlights what we have been preaching for decades: that investors need to get back to real investing. The smartphone-era, second-by-second money movement, and the idea that investors should be pursuing real-time changes in "valuation," is only the latest and most-destructive phase of the decades-long arc of so-called "modern portfolio theory". It is our view that this theoretical analysis, which de-emphasizes the importance of fundamental analysis of an investment and replaces it with an almost cult-like worship of the ability of "the market" to accurately value everything instantaneously, has hijacked the investment world and convinced too many investors that investing all comes down to algorithms.
To us, "getting back to real investing", means evaluating businesses (or bonds or any other securities) based on their fundamentals, and investing in them for their long-term prospects, through the ups and downs of the panic-of-the-moment. It is the opposite of the kind of short-term focus that has characterized most fast-money institutional managers, and which has spread to just about anyone with a smartphone (just imagine if the crowd in Wonderful Life had all had smartphones and trading accounts!).
Sadly, even the most (supposedly) sophisticated investors, including Silicon Valley venture firms, have been caught up in two decades of malinvestment built on short-termism and the demise of what we call real investing. Perhaps the events of this week will lead to a re-evaluation of these very serious problems and a change for the better. At least, we certainly hope that they will.
* Disclosure: At the time of publication, the principals of Taylor Frigon Capital owned shares of ClearPoint Neuro (CLPT).
Disclosures: Please remember that past performance may not be indicative of future results. Different types of investments involve varying degrees of risk, and there can be no assurance that the future performance of any specific investment, investment strategy, or product (including the investments and/or investment strategies recommended or undertaken by Taylor Frigon Capital Management LLC (“Taylor Frigon”), or any non-investment related content, made reference to directly or indirectly in this blog will be profitable, equal any corresponding indicated historical performance level(s), be suitable for your portfolio or individual situation, or prove successful. Due to various factors, including changing market conditions and/or applicable laws, the content may no longer be reflective of current opinions or positions. Moreover, you should not assume that any discussion or information contained in this blog serves as the receipt of, or as a substitute for, personalized investment advice from Taylor Frigon. To the extent that a reader has any questions regarding the applicability of any specific issue discussed above to his/her individual situation, he/she is encouraged to consult with the professional advisor of his/her choosing. Taylor Frigon is neither a law firm nor a certified public accounting firm and no portion of the blog content should be construed as legal or accounting advice. A copy of the Taylor Frigon’s current written disclosure Brochure discussing our advisory services and fees is available upon request. If you are a Taylor Frigon client, please remember to contact Taylor Frigon, in writing, if there are any changes in your personal/financial situation or investment objectives for the purpose of reviewing/evaluating/revising our previous recommendations and/or services, or if you would like to impose, add, or to modify any reasonable restrictions to our investment advisory services.
Episode 43: SVB Blows Up
Episode 42: Fit To Spit
Episode 41: Where'd Everyone Go?
Episode 40: Hit On The Business, Miss On The Stock?
Episode 39: Episode 39: Taking On Economists (And Pilots)
Episode 38: Bouncing Around
Episode 37: Eighth Time's A Charm?
Episode 36: Never Sell...Until It's Time To Sell
Investment Climate January 2023: Rip Van Winkle Revisited
The troubled year 2022 has come to a close, and with it has ended our worst year ever (by far) of investment returns on our portfolio companies. That worst year of performance follows immediately on the heels of 2021, which, until Nov 2021 was our best two-year period of investment returns in our Core Growth Strategy. Conversely, our Income Strategy performed quite well, but we will focus here on Core Growth. Such wild and violent swings in market values give rise to some analysis and reflection on the state of the underlying businesses themselves, as well as on the state of the markets, which set the prices of our investments.
Over the years, we have in our blog posts referred to the well-known story of Rip Van Winkle, published by the famous early American author Washington Irving. A somewhat unreliable fellow tells a tale about falling asleep in the Catskill Mountains of upstate New York for twenty years (nonstop), and returns to his sleepy little village to find that it is now a bustling town, full of people he does not recognize and who do not recognize him. And what is more, there has been a revolution in his absence, where the former colonies of the British Empire are now an independent democratic republic!
We first wrote about Rip Van Winkle in September of 2009, asking what a similar sleeper who had slept for one full year (nonstop) since September of 2008 might observe about the markets, had he or she not been awake through the tremendous crash and subsequent return of market prices in the interim -- and we revisited this theme in 2010 and again in 2013.
Now, having experienced both the most violent upward movement of prices (in 2020-2021) and the most violent downdraft in prices (in 2022) of our portfolio companies that we have ever experienced in over 35 years of professional investing, we ask the question: “What if Rip Van Winkle had fallen asleep at the end of 2019 – completely unsuspecting of the oncoming Covid panic and lockdown – and then stayed asleep all the way until the end of 2022?”
In asking this question, we want to imagine that this sleeper awakens to look at the actual business performance of the companies in the Taylor Frigon Core Growth Strategy during the period encompassing the end of 2019 through the end of 2022. While it may come as a tremendous shock to most readers, our analysis found that during the period that our modern-day Rip Van Winkle took his most-recent nap, every single one of our portfolio companies grew their annual revenues – and in most cases they did not just grow those revenues by an insignificant amount but instead grew them at a very respectable rate!
In other words, even though the growth companies are going through one of the most brutal bear markets that we have ever seen in all our years of managing investments, the companies in which we are investing are growing their businesses – and in most cases are doing so at strong rates of growth – despite the fact that many of them have seen vicious reductions in their stock prices over the same Rip Van Winkle period (although not all have seen net declines in stock price: some of our companies are trading higher than they were at the end of 2019, despite the current bear market).
To cite a few examples, we might point to Twilio, a provider of customer engagement solutions consisting of communications and data analysis tools for business customers, which had revenues of $1.1 billion over the four quarters ending December 2019, and which had $3.7 billion in revenues over the four quarters ending September 2022 (we used the four quarters ending in September because most companies have yet reported their official numbers for the quarter which just ended on December 31, 2022). So, Twilio revenues are now 223% higher than they were when Rip Van Winkle went to sleep at the end of 2019 – and yet Twilio’s stock price has declined by fully 50% over a similar period.
Other examples of portfolio companies who have grown their revenues at a very respectable rate include two companies which sell devices used for aesthetics and cosmetic surgery: Apyx (makers of the Renuvion line of devices) and Inmode (makers of the BodyTite line and other lines of products). During the period of Rip Van Winkle’s 2019 to 2022 nap, these two companies have grown their one-year revenues from $28 million to $49 million (in the case of Apyx) and from $156 million to $431 million (in the case of Inmode).
As a final example, Vapotherm (makers of the HVT line of high-velocity respiratory devices and other products for respiratory therapy and support) has seen their revenues increase from $48 million for 2019 to $70 million for the four quarters ending September 2022. In the interim, their revenues shot even higher, driven by hospital purchases during Covid in 2022 – but even after that extraordinary year ended and purchases decreased, the company’s revenues are much higher in 2022 than they were at the end of 2019 before the pandemic had been declared (and before it had even hit the news). Had Rip Van Winkle fallen asleep in 2019 and awakened at the end of 2022, he would observe that Vapotherm has done a good job of almost doubling its annual revenues – and yet the stock price and market capitalization of the company declined by over 70% during the same interval.
We would readily agree with the argument that the “recovery-induced mania” of 2021, during which stock prices rose rapidly across the board during the first three quarters of the year and during which our portfolio stocks rose even more rapidly, was probably overdone. But we would also argue that stock prices and valuation multiples almost certainly should not have been crushed to the degree that they have been crushed in 2022, either.
The main cause of the pounding that growth company stock prices experienced during 2022 was external to the businesses themselves: the Federal Reserve initiated the most rapid (in many decades) raising of interest rates during 2022 in order to come to grips with inflation, and by all appearances the Fed is not done yet. We are on record having warned about the danger of inflation caused by easy money – and during 2022 we certainly saw the inflationary results of tremendously easy money, which led to the Fed’s tightening campaign.
But the whole point of imagining Rip Van Winkle taking naps over various periods is to advise long-term investors to avoid fixating on the quarter-to-quarter or even year-to-year fluctuations that will always be part of the market’s landscape. We recognize that these violent swings – and especially the violent swings we have experienced in recent years – are very painful, and we certainly do not deny that or belittle it. However, we are convinced that the right way to invest is to focus on the businesses – and we continue to be impressed with the progress that our portfolio companies have shown over the years. We anticipate that business success will, in the long term, lead to investment success.
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